Against a Davidsonian analysis of copula sentences by Maienborn, Claudia
M. Kadowaki and S. Kawahara (2003, eds.). NELS 33 Proceedings.
Against a Davidsonian Analysis of Copula Sentences*
Claudia Maienborn 
Humboldt University Berlin 
1. Introduction 
Semantic research over the past three decades has provided impressive confirmation of 
Donald Davidson’s famous claim that “there is a lot of language we can make systematic 
sense of if we suppose events exist” (Davidson 1980:137). Nowadays, Davidsonian event 
arguments are no longer reserved only for action verbs (as Davidson originally proposed) 
or even only for the category of verbs, but instead are widely assumed to be associated 
with any kind of predicate (e.g. Higginbotham 2000, Parsons 2000).1 The following 
quotation from Higginbotham and Ramchand (1997) illustrates the reasoning that moti-
vates this move: 
Once we assume that predicates (or their verbal, etc. heads) have a posi-
tion for events, taking the many consequences that stem therefrom, as out-
lined in publications originating with Donald Davidson (1967), and further 
applied in Higginbotham (1985, 1989), and Terence Parsons (1990), we 
are not in a position to deny an event-position to any predicate; for the 
evidence for, and applications of, the assumption are the same for all 
predicates.   (Higginbotham and Ramchand 1997:54)  
In fact, since Davidson’s original proposal the burden of proof for postulating event ar-
guments seems to have shifted completely, leading Raposo and Uriagereka (1995), for 
example, to the following verdict: 
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Engelberg, Werner Frey, Bart Geurts, Gerhard Jäger, Hans Kamp, Manfred Krifka, Fred Landman, Ewald 
Lang, Barbara Partee, Benjamin Shaer and Arnim von Stechow for helpful discussion and comments. Spe-
cial thanks to Ben for checking my English. 
1 Throughout this paper, I use the term “event” as a cover term for events proper, processes and 
(certain) states; cf. Bach’s (1986) notion “eventuality”. Other labels that can be found in the literature for an 
additional Davidsonian event argument include “spatiotemporal location” (e.g. Kratzer 1995) and “David-
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it is unclear what it means for a predicate not to have a Davidsonian argu-
ment   (Raposo and Uriagereka 1995:182) 
That is, Davidsonian eventuality arguments apparently have become something like a 
trademark for predicates in general.  
  The goal of the present paper is to subject this view of the relationship between 
predicates and events to real scrutiny. By taking a closer look at the simplest independent 
predicational structure – viz. copula sentences – I will argue that current Davidsonian 
approaches tend to stretch the notion of events too far, thereby giving up much of its lin-
guistic and ontological usefulness. More specifically, the paper will tackle the following 
three questions: 
1.  Do copula sentences support the current view of the inherent event-relatedness of 
predicates? 
2.  If not, what is a possible alternative to an event-based analysis of copula sen-
tences? 
3.  What does this tell us about Davidsonian events?
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 first reviews current event-based analyses of 
copula sentences and then gives a brief summary of the Davidsonian notion of events. 
Section 3 examines the behavior of copula sentences with respect to some standard (as 
well as some new) eventuality diagnostics. Copula expressions will turn out to fail all 
eventuality tests. They differ sharply from state verbs like stand, sit, sleep in this respect. 
(The latter pass all eventuality tests and therefore qualify as true “Davidsonian state” ex-
pressions.) On the basis of these observations, section 4 provides an alternative account of 
copula sentences that combines Kim’s (1969, 1976) notion of property exemplifications 
with Asher’s (1993, 2000) conception of abstract objects. Specifically, I will argue that 
the copula introduces a referential argument for a temporally bound property exemplifica-
tion (= “Kimian state”). The proposal is implemented within a DRT framework. Finally, 
section 5 offers some concluding remarks and suggests that supplementing Davidsonian 
eventualities by Kimian states not only yields a more adequate analysis for copula expres-
sions and the like but may also improve our treatment of events. 
2.  Event-based analyses of copula sentences 
Within the Davidsonian paradigm, copula sentences are standardly analyzed as referring 
to eventualities or, more specifically, to states, in which a property given by the predicate 
holds of the subject referent. There are basically two strategies for implementing this 
idea, that differ with respect to the source that they claim for the eventuality argument, 
one taking this to be introduced by the copula and the other taking it to originate in the 
predicate. Against a Davidsonian Analysis of Copula Sentences 
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2.1.  The copula as the source of the eventuality argument 
The assumption that the eventuality argument is introduced by the copula is advocated, 
for example, by Bierwisch (1988), Kamp and Reyle (1993), and Rothstein (1999). 
According to this view, English be, German sein etc. are semantically poor full verbs. 
They provide a verbal shell that is filled by the lexical content of the predicate. As Roth-
stein (1999:363) argues, be “[l]ike any verb, [...] introduces a Davidsonian eventuality 
argument, but unlike lexical verbs, it does not express any property of that argument.” 
This approach predicts, then, that combinations of copula and predicate behave like regu-
lar eventuality expressions; cf. Maienborn (2003a) for a more detailed discussion of Roth-
stein’s account especially. 
2.2.  The predicate as the source of the eventuality argument 
The alternative view, that the eventuality argument is introduced by the predicate, has 
been adopted and further developed by Kratzer and others against the background of the 
ongoing stage-level/individual-level debate. According to Kratzer’s original (1995) pro-
posal, only stage-level predicates (SLPs) have an additional eventuality argument, while 
individual-level predicates (ILPs) lack such an argument.2 Thus, adopting a Parsons-style 
notation, we would assign a copula sentence with a SLP, like tired in (1a), a semantic 
representation like (1b), whereas an ILP like blond in (2a) would yield (2b). Under this 
assumption only SLPs pattern with eventuality expressions like the state verb sleep in (3). 
(1)  a.   Carol was tired. 
 b.    ∃e [tired (e) & theme (e, carol)] 
(2) a.    Carol  was  blond. 
 b.    blond  (carol) 
(3)  a.   Carol was sleeping. 
 b.    ∃e [sleep (e) & theme (e, carol)] 
Most advocates of the stage-level/individual-level distinction now agree that SLPs and 
ILPs alike have an extra eventuality argument; and different ways of accounting for their 
differences are currently being considered. For example, Chierchia (1995) and McNally 
(1998) have suggested that SLPs and ILPs refer to different types of eventualities (viz. 
location dependent vs. location independent eventualities); while authors like Ramchand 
(1996) and Fernald (2000) have considered the possibility that SLPs are equipped (either 
2 The distinction between stage-level predicates, which express temporary/accidental properties, 
and individual-level predicates, which express (more or less) permanent/inherent properties, goes back to 
Milsark (1974, 1977) and Carlson (1977). Following Kratzer (1995) and Diesing (1992), most current treat-
ments of the stage-level/individual-level contrast take it to be a grammatical distinction that reflects a (still 
not fully understood) conceptual opposition; cf. Maienborn (2003a) for a critical evaluation. An overview 
of the linguistic phenomena that have been associated with the stage-level/individual-level distinction can 
be found in Higginbotham and Ramchand (1997), Fernald (2000), and Jäger (2001). Claudia Maienborn 
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structurally or lexically) with yet another eventuality argument besides the “regular” one 
shared by all predicates.  
  The brief remarks just given might suffice to illustrate how basic the notion of 
events has become for an analysis of predicates in current research. Moreover, despite 
the significant differences that exist between the approaches discussed so far, what all of 
them have in common is the prediction they make that copula-predicate combinations 
behave like other verbs with respect to Davidsonian eventualities. The grammar does not 
distinguish, then, between the expression of a property holding of an individual and the 
expression of an eventuality and its participants. If a grammatically significant distinc-
tion   is drawn at all, this rests on the difference between temporary and permanent 
properties.
2.3  Eventualities: ontological properties and linguistic diagnostics 
In order to examine whether the predictions of these event-based approaches are correct, 
let us briefly review the basic tenets of the Davidsonian paradigm. Crucially, events, on 
this view, are conceived of as spatiotemporal entities. Moreover, according to many au-
thors (e.g. Carlson 1998, Eckardt 1998, Asher 2000 Maienborn 2003a), events necessarily 
involve participants serving some function. Although there is still no commonly accepted 
way to turn these ontological requirements into exact identity criteria for events, and there 
may never be one,3 I will adopt (4) as a working definition for subsequent discussion.
(4)  Working definition of eventualities:
  Eventualities are spatiotemporal entities with functionally integrated participants. 
Several properties, as given in (5), follow from this definition: 
(5)  Ontological properties of eventualities: 
 a.    Eventualities  are  perceptible. 
  b.   Eventualities can be located in space and time. 
  c.   Eventualities can vary in the way they take place. 
These ontological properties can, in turn, be used to derive a set of linguistic eventuality 
diagnostics: 
(6)  Linguistic diagnostics for eventualities: 
  a.   Eventuality expressions can serve as infinitival complements of perception 
verbs; cf. Higginbotham (1983). 
  b.   Eventuality expressions combine with locative and temporal modifiers. 
  c.    Eventuality expressions combine with manner adverbials, instrumentals, 
comitatives, etc. 
3 In their recent state-of-the-art article on the ontological nature of events, Pianesi and Varzi 
(2000:12) conclude: “the idea that events are spatiotemporal particulars whose identity criteria are mode-
rately thin […] has found many advocates both in the philosophical and in the linguistic literature. […] But 
they all share with Davidson’s the hope for a ‘middle ground’ account of the number of particular events 
that may simultaneously occur in the same place.” Against a Davidsonian Analysis of Copula Sentences 
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This, in a nutshell, is the Davidsonian view of events shared (explicitly or implicitly) by 
current event-based approaches. It is worth emphasizing that there is unanimity with 
regard to the validity of the linguistic diagnostics given in (6).4 Thus, (4)-(6) remind us 
(in the words of Raposo and Uriagereka 1995) “what it means for an expression to have a 
Davidsonian argument”. 
3.  Evidence against event-based accounts of copula sentences 
The diagnostics in (6) provide a way to test the predictions of event-based accounts of 
copula sentences. In what follows, these eventuality tests will be applied to the German 
copula sein; cf. Maienborn (2003a, 2003b) for a discussion of the Spanish copula forms 
ser and estar.
3.1. Infinitival  complements of perception verbs 
The sentences in (7) show that copula constructions do not show up as infinitival comple-
ments of perception verbs. SLPs and ILPs do not differ in this respect; cf. (7a/b) and (7c). 
This has already been discussed by Carlson (1977:125f). 
(7)  a.  * Ich sah Carol müde sein.  copula + SLP
     I    saw Carol tired be. 
  b. * Ich hörte das Radio laut sein.  copula + SLP
     I    heard the  radio loud be. 
  c.  * Ich sah Carol blond/intelligent/Französin sein.  copula + ILP
     I    saw Carol blond/intelligent/French      be. 
If we compare copula constructions with full verbs, we observe that there is a class of 
verbs – what Lakoff (1966) calls “statives” – that display exactly the same behavior, as 
shown in (8). 
(8)  a.  * Ich sah die Tomaten 1 Kg wiegen.  statives
     I    saw the tomatoes 1 kg weigh. 
  b. * Ich hörte  Carol die Antwort wissen. 
     I     heard Carol the answer   know. 
4 Evidence that ordinary eventuality expressions (i.e. events proper and processes) indeed conform 
to the diagnostics given in (6) can be found in any work on event semantics. I will therefore not repeat this 
evidence here. However, I will, for sake of comparison, take into account the murky class of state expres-
sions when discussing the behavior of copula sentences. Most relevant here is that states differ from 
processes in their subinterval properties: while processes have a lower bound for the size of subintervals 
that are of the same type, states have no such lower bound, i.e., states also hold at atomic times (e.g. Dowty 
1979, Krifka 1989). Notice that under this criterion verbs like sleep and wait, which are sometimes classi-
fied as process verbs, denote states. Claudia Maienborn 
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Yet, there is another class of verbs – let us call them “state verbs” for now – that can ser-
ve as infinitival complements of perception verbs. Included in this class are locative verbs 
like sit, stand, and lie as well as verbs like sleep and wait. These are illustrated in (9).5
(9)  a.   Ich sah Carol am     Fenster  stehen.  state verbs
     I    saw Carol at.the window stand. 
  b.   Ich sah Carol warten/schlafen. 
     I    saw Carol wait    /sleep. 
The differences between (7)-(8) and (9) are clearly not a matter of interpretability and 
thus most likely have a grammatical source. Consider the minimal pair in (10). Both 
sentences could describe one and the same scenario. Yet, while (10a) is perfectly fine, 
(10b) is plainly unacceptable. 
(10)  a.   Ich sah das Buch auf dem Tisch liegen.   
     I     saw the book on  the   table  lie. 
  b. * Ich sah das Buch auf dem Tisch sein. 
     I    saw the book on   the   table  be. 
In sum, copula sentences fail to pass our first eventuality test and in this respect pattern 
with stative verbs. 
3.2.  Combination with locative modifiers 
What about the occurrence of copula constructions with locative modifiers?6 Sentences 
like those in (11) are generally understood to provide strong evidence that at least SLPs 
have an underlying eventuality argument, which may serve as a target for a locative 
modifier (e.g. Kratzer 1995, Chierchia 1995, Fernald 2000). 
(11)  a.   Carol war im      Auto müde/hungrig.   
     Carol was in.the car    tired /hungry. 
  b.  ?? Carol war im      Auto blond/intelligent/eine kluge Linguistin. 
     Carol was in.the car    blond/intelligent /a     smart linguist. 
Data like these lead Fernald (2000:24) to conclude: “It is clear that SLPs differ from ILPs 
in the ability to be located in space and time”.  
  However, there are good reasons to be skeptical of this claim. I have argued in 
(Maienborn 2001) that there are three types of locative modifiers that can be distin-
5 The observation that stative verbs do not show up as infinitival complements of perception verbs 
has also been made by Katz (2000). Katz does not take into account the behavior of state verbs illustrated in 
(9), though. This leads him to draw the conclusion – which to my mind is incorrect – that the relevant 
difference can be traced to the difference between states and events. As I will argue in the text, an adequate 
analysis of both eventive and stative expressions requires us to recognize that the Davidsonian category of 
eventualities includes static eventualities besides events and processes. 
6 The occurrence of copula constructions with temporal modifiers will be discussed in sec. 4.1. Against a Davidsonian Analysis of Copula Sentences 
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guished on syntactic as well as semantic grounds. These three types, which I describe as 
“frame-setting”, “event-external”, and “event-internal”, are indicated in (12). 
(12)  weil     in den Anden  Schafe auf dem Marktplatz  an den Ohren   markiert werden 
  because in the Andes   sheep on the market place   at the ears        marked   are 
ĹĹ Ĺ
 frame-setting  event-external  event-internal 
While event-external and event-internal modifiers have a base adjunction site inside the 
VP, frame-setting modifiers are base generated outside it, within the verb’s functional 
shell. Moreover, unlike VP-internal modifers, frame-setting modifiers do not relate to an 
underlying eventuality argument but provide a semantically underspecified domain re-
striction for the overall proposition; see Maienborn (2001) for syntactic and semantic 
details. Given their semantic indeterminacy, frame-setting modifiers may be interpreted in 
several ways. Take, for example, the sentence in (13), which has at least three readings, as 
paraphrased in (13a-c). (The sentence adverb leider is used to indicate the VP boundary; 
cf. Diesing 1992, Frey 2000.) 
(13)  weil       Diego Armando Maradona in Italien (leider)             verheiratet war. 
  because Diego Armando Maradona in Italy    (unfortunately) married      was. 
  a.   When he was in Italy, Maradona was married.  temporal reading
  b.   According to the laws in Italy, Maradona was married. 
  c.   According to the belief of the people in Italy, Maradona was married.
Most importantly for our present concerns, frame-setting modifiers may be interpreted as 
restricting the topic time of a sentence (cf. Klein 1994), thus yielding a temporal reading, 
as illustrated in (13a). That is, temporally interpreted frame-setting modifiers restrict the 
time for which the speaker makes a claim; they do not locate the verb’s eventuality argu-
ment. Hence, they shoud not be confused with event-external modifiers.7
  The examples given in (11) might now be seen in a different light. The locatives in 
(11) do not belong to the class of event-related modifiers but are frame-setting modifiers. 
More specifically, the observed difference between (11a) and (11b) involves the accept-
ability of these sentences under a temporal reading of the locative frame. That is, what the 
data in (11) really show is this: among the potential readings of frame-setting modifiers 
7 Notice that a sentence such as (i), with a frame-setting locative ‘in Italy’ and an event-external 
locative ‘in France’, is not contradictory but may receive the interpretation ‘during his stay in Italy, Mara-
dona used to buy his suits in France’. In (ii) the absence of conflicting information might invite the 
inference that the buying events took place in Italy, but this kind of inference relies on world knowledge 
and may easily be overridden, i.e., such inferences are not legitimated by the sentence’s logical structure. 
(i)  In Italien kaufte   Maradona seine Anzüge in Frankreich. 
  In Italy    bought Maradona his     suits       in France. 
(ii)  In Italien kaufte   Maradona seine Anzüge mit  Carol. 
  In Italy    bought Maradona his     suits      with Carol. Claudia Maienborn 
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there appears to be one reading that excludes ILPs as main predicates.8 However, these 
and similar data do not present any evidence for the presence or absence of an underlying 
event argument.  
  Frame-setting modifiers are not event-related. Therefore, they cannot be used in 
eventuality diagnostics. If we want to check for underlying event arguments we have to 
make sure that we are testing for real event-related, i.e. VP-internal, locative modifiers. 
Modifiers of this type are given in (14). (The temporal adverbials prevent the locatives 
from being “rescued” by a temporal frame-setter analysis.) 
(14)  a.  * Das Kleid ist auf der Wäscheleine nass.  SLP
     The dress  is  on  the  clothesline   wet. 
  b. * Paul war (zu dieser Zeit) unter  der Straßenlaterne betrunken. 
     Paul was (at  this    time) under the street lamp      drunk. 
  c.  * Der  Sekt          ist (immer noch) im   Wohnzimmer warm. 
     The champagne is (still)             in.the living room  warm. 
  d. * Carol ist (gerade)             im     Auto müde. 
     Carol is  (at the moment) in.the car   tired. 
  e.  * Carol war (die ganze Zeit)  vor       dem   Spiegel blond/eitel/intelligent.  ILP
     Carol was (the whole time) in-front-of the mirror blond/vain/intelligent. 
If either the copula or the predicate introduced an eventuality argument, we would expect 
a locative modifier expressing the location of the eventuality to be possible. That is, a 
sentence like (14a) should be able to indicate that there is a state of the dress being wet 
and that this state is located on the clothesline. Yet there is no such interpretation for 
(14a). Even worse, all of the sentences in (14) are unacceptable regardless of whether 
they contain SLPs (14a-d) or ILPs (14e). Again, we see that copula sentences pattern with 
statives (15) and not with state verbs (16). 
(15) a.  *  Die  Tomaten  wiegen  neben  den Paprikas 1 Kg.  statives
     The tomatoes weigh  besides the paprikas 1 kg. 
  b. * Carol weiß    (gerade)             an der Tafel         die Antwort. 
     Carol knows (at the moment) at the blackboard the answer. 
8 Apparently, a temporal reading of the locative frame forces us to interpret the main predicate as 
holding only temporarily. In (Maienborn 2003a), I propose a pragmatic explanation for this temporariness 
effect in terms of Blutner’s (2000) OT version of the Gricean maxims.  
If the main predicate resists this move, as we find with ILPs, a frame-setting locative may still be 
interpreted along the lines of (13b-c), which gives us the preferred readings for (i) and (ii) below. That is, 
the grammar does not prohibit ILPs from combining with frame-setting modifiers; cf. Maienborn (2001). 
(i)  In Deutschland ist Juhnke berühmt.  ‘Among the people in Germany, Juhnke is famous.’ 
  In Germany       is Juhnke famous. 
(ii)  In Deutschland ist Juhnke weltberühmt.  ‘According to the belief of the people in Germany, 
  In Germany       is Juhnke world famous.   Juhnke is world famous.’ Against a Davidsonian Analysis of Copula Sentences 
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(16)  a.   Paul schläft (gerade)             im      Auto.  state verbs
     Paul sleeps  (at the moment) in.the car. 
  b.   Carol steht    am     Fenster. 
     Carol stands at.the window. 
Summing up, there is no grammatical difference between SLPs and ILPs with respect to 
locative modifiers. Both combine with frame-setting locatives and both exclude event-
related locatives. Despite what has commonly been claimed (cf. the quotation from Fer-
nald 2000), SLPs and ILPs do not differ in their (in-)ability to be located in space. 
3.3.  Combination with manner adverbials and the like 
The same picture emerges with manner modification. Copula expressions and statives do 
not combine with manner adverbials, comitatives and the like, whereas state verbs do, as 
(17)-(19) show. (See also (Katz 2000, 2003) for the inability of manner adverbs to occur 
with stative verbs.) 
(17)  a.  * Carol war unruhig    durstig. 
     Carol was restlessly thirsty. 
  b. * Paul  war friedlich/mit seinem Teddy/ohne     Schnuller müde. 
     Paul was calmly   /with his       teddy/ without dummy    tired. 
  c.  * Paul war reglos         im      Zimmer. 
     Paul was motionless in.the room. 
(18)  a.  * Maria ähnelt       mit   ihrer Tochter  Romy Schneider.  statives
     Maria resembles with her   daughter Romy Schneider. 
  b. * Paul besitzt sparsam/spendabel   viel   Geld. 
     Paul owns  thriftily  /generously much money. 
(19)  a.   Paul schläft friedlich/mit seinem Teddy/ohne     Schnuller.  state verbs
     Paul sleeps  calmly   /with his      teddy/without dummy. 
  b.   Carol saß reglos       /kerzengerade    am     Tisch. 
     Carol sat motionless/straight as a die at.the table. 
Further evidence for this contrast, and for the existence of underlying eventuality argu-
ments, is given in (20). Sentences like (20a) provide evidence for such arguments, since it 
is not Carol but the state of Carol standing on the ladder that is steady and the state of her 
holding the box that is unsteady (e.g. Eckardt 1998). It would make perfect sense to inter-
pret (20b) in the same vein. Yet, (20b) is clearly unacceptable. 
(20)  a.   Carol stand   sicher   auf der Leiter  und hielt zur   gleichen Zeit unsicher 
     Carol stood steadily on  the  ladder and held  at.the same    time unsteadily 
     die  Kiste. 
     the  box. 
  b. * Carol war sicher    Alpinistin und unsicher   Pianistin. 
     Carol was steadily alpinist     and unsteadily pianist. Claudia Maienborn 
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Sentences like (21) might, at first sight, be taken to provide counter-evidence to my claim 
that copula constructions do not combine with manner adverbials. 
(21)  a.   Carol war schnell in der Stadt. 
     Carol was quickly in the town. 
  b.   Paul war mit    Begeisterung Opa. 
     Paul was with enthusiasm     grandpa. 
  c.   Das Fenster  war  weit    offen. 
     The window was widely open. 
Yet, closer inspection reveals that they all involve some kind of non-compositional rein-
terpretation; cf. their ill-formed variants in (22).  
(22)  a.  * Carol war langsam in der Stadt. 
     Carol was slowly   in the town. 
  b.  ?? Paul war mit    Begeisterung Verwandter (von Grit). 
     Paul was with enthusiasm     relative        (of    Grit). 
  c. ?? Die Höhle war weit     offen. 
     The cave   was widely open. 
Sentence (21a), for example, is subject to an ingressive coercion; quickly does not modify 
a state of Carol being in the city but an event of her going to the city. Similarly, the adver-
bial  with enthusiasm triggers an agentive coercion in (21b).What Paul is enthusiastic 
about are the activities associated with being a grandpa. No such activities come into 
mind in the case of being a relative (of Grit). This is the reason why (22b) is odd. Finally, 
despite first appearances, there is likewise no straightforward integration for the adverb 
widely in (21c), since the variant (22c) should otherwise be fine. Roughly speaking, 
widely modifies the resultant object of an opening event. Caves, being natural openings, 
do not lend themselves to such a reinterpretation; cf. Geuder (2000), Maienborn (2003a) 
for details. 
  We may conclude that sentences such as (21)/(22) are based on (more or less 
plausible) non-compositional reinterpretations, which are triggered by a sortal conflict 
between the modifier and the copula construction. Thus, sentences like these, though they 
seem to counterexemplify the claim that copula constructions do not combine regularly 
with manner adverbials, actually turn out to support this claim. 
3.4.  A new eventuality diagnostic: ein bisschen (‘a little bit’) 
In this section, I will suggest a new eventuality diagnostic based on the modifier ein biss-
chen ‘a little bit’. In combination with a process verb like sweat, as given in (24), ein biss-
chen displays two readings. As a degree modifier, it indicates that the amount of sweat 
was small. As an eventive modifier, it indicates that the run-time of the process was short. 
(The eventive reading applies only to homogeneous eventualities.) 
(23)  Carol hat gestern     ein bisschen geschwitzt.  degree and eventive reading
  Carol has yesterday a little bit     sweated. Against a Davidsonian Analysis of Copula Sentences 
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When combining with state verbs, ein bisschen always supports the eventive reading, as 
shown in (24). Whether or not there is also an additional degree reading depends on the 
verb meaning. 
(24)  a.   Carol hat ein bisschen geschlafen.  eventive reading
     Carol has a little bit     slept. 
  b.   Paul hat ein bisschen im     Garten gesessen.  eventive reading
     Paul has  a little bit    in.the garden sat. 
  c.   Das Fenster  hat ein bisschen offen gestanden.  degree and eventive reading
     The window has a little bit     open stood. 
Strikingly, copula sentences and statives like those in (25)-(26) lack the eventive reading 
of ein bisschen and display only the degree reading: 
(25)  a.   Carol war ein bisschen müde/wütend/hungrig.  only degree reading
     Carol was a little bit     tired /angry/   hungry. 
  b. * Die Ampel        war  ein bisschen gelb.   
     The traffic light was a little bit      yellow. 
  c.  * Carol trug     die Kiste selbst,   denn     sie   war erst ein bisschen schwanger.   
     Carol carried the box   herself, because she was only a little bit    pregnant. 
  d.   Die Telekom-Aktie  war ein bisschen billig.  only degree reading
     The Telekom share  was a little bit     cheap. 
(26)  a.  * Nach ihrer 5. Heirat      hieß            Liz ein bisschen Burton.   
     After her   5
th marriage was-named Liz a little bit     Burton. 
  b. * (Kaufen Sie jetzt!) Diese Aktie kostet nur  ein bisschen so wenig.
     (Buy            now!) This    share costs  only a little bit     so little.  
  c.   Carol ähnelte     ein bisschen ihrer Großmutter.  only degree reading
     Carol resembled a little bit     her   grandmother. 
Notice that the eventive reading of ein bisschen would definitevely make sense in these 
cases. If copula constructions or statives did introduce an eventuality argument, then we 
would expect the addition of ein bisschen to indicate that some state lasted for a short 
time. Yet the grammar does not appear to support such a reading. 
  The various eventuality tests described above thus produce the following conver-
gent results: 
1.  Copula sentences fail all of these eventuality tests, just as statives do. 
2.  SLPs and ILPs exhibit no grammatically significant differences on these tests. 
3.  State verbs pass all of the eventuality tests. 
Two conclusions can be drawn from these findings. First, there are no good reasons to 
assume that copula constructions (and statives) introduce a Davidsonian argument, 
regardless of whether they are classified as SLPs or ILPs. Thus, we definitely are “in a Claudia Maienborn 
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position to deny an event-position to (copula plus) any predicate” (contra, i.a.,   
Higginbotham and Ramchand 1997).  
  Secondly, the borderline drawn by the eventuality diagnostics does not coincide 
with a difference between events and states (contra Katz 2000, 2003). State verbs qualify 
as true eventuality expressions, denoting static Davidsonian eventualities. In the remain-
ing part of this paper, I will call these entities “Davidsonian states” or “D-states”. 
  If we take the Davidsonian notion of eventualities seriously – and the progress 
achieved by event semantics provides good reasons to do so – we have little choice but to 
reject event-based approaches to copula sentences. Event arguments apparently are not as 
freely available as currently assumed within the Davidsonian paradigm. This concludes 
the destructive part of the paper. 
4.  An alternative account of copula sentences 
4.1.  Evidence for an underlying argument 
If copula sentences do not introduce a Davidsonian eventuality argument, this raises two 
obvious possibilities: that they do not introduce any referential argument at all; and that 
they just refer to a different kind of entity. In this section, I will present some linguistic 
evidence in support of the latter possibility. 
  First of all, copula constructions clearly combine with all kinds of temporal modi-
fiers, as (27) shows. If we want to give (standard) temporal adverbials a straightforward 
analysis as intersective modifiers, in the spirit of Davidson, then the combination of 
copula plus predicate should at least contribute a temporal argument. This might then 
serve as a target for temporal modification. 
(27)  a.   Carol war gestern    /immer/zweimal/tagelang müde. 
     Carol was yesterday/always/twice    /for days tired. 
  b.   Die 3 war gestern    /immer/zweimal/jahrelang Pauls Glückszahl. 
     The 3 was yesterday/always/twice    /for years  Paul’s lucky number. 
Secondly, data such as (28) indicate that copula constructions are subject to a specific 
kind of anaphoric reference. In (28a), for example, the anaphoric pronoun das refers back 
to some “state” of Carol being angry. Notice that das cannot be analyzed as a fact 
anaphor here, given that facts are atemporal (e.g., Asher 1993, 2000). 
(28)  a.   Carol ist wütend. Das wird bald vorbei sein. 
     Carol is   angry.  This will soon over    be. 
  b.   Der Schlüssel war weg  und das  seit   dem Wochenende. 
     The key          was away and this since the   weekend. 
This suggests that copula plus predicate indeed introduce an underlying argument that can 
be located in time and allows for anaphoric reference. A further piece of evidence comes 
from the German anaphoric expression dabei (literally: “there-at”) illustrated in (29), 
which adds some accompanying circumstance to its antecedent. Against a Davidsonian Analysis of Copula Sentences 
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(29)  a.   Es war kalt und dabei     regnerisch. 
     It  was cold and there-at rainy. 
  b.   Carol war krank und lief       dabei     ohne     Schal herum. 
     Carol was ill       and walked there-at without scarf  about. 
  c.   Die Zwei ist eine Primzahl        und dabei    gerade. 
     The two   is  a     prime number and there-at even. 
Sentence (29b), for example, indicates that the “state” of Carol being ill is accompanied 
by (possibly iterated) events of Carol walking about without a scarf. Notice that the ante-
cedent of dabei may also be an ILP like ‘being a prime number’ as in (29c). In 
(Maienborn 2003a), I argue that dabei does not express mere temporal overlap but relates 
to the substance of its antecedent. This calls for a reification of the denotatum of copula-
predicate combinations. In what follows, I will call the entities denoted by copula con-
structions (and statives) “Kimian states” or “K-states”. 
4.2.  On the nature of Kimian states 
In the philosophical discussion initiated by Davidson’s (1967) “invention” of events, Kim 
(1969, 1976) advocated an alternative view, according to which events should be under-
stood as temporally bound property exemplifications. While there are good reasons to 
reject Kim’s proposal as a substitute for the Davidsonian approach summarized in (4)-(6) 
(cf., e.g., Engelberg 2000, Maienborn 2003a), Kim’s alternative becomes more attractive 
if it is taken as description for the entity referred to by copula expressions and statives. 
  More specifically, my copula analysis will combine Kim’s approach with Asher’s 
(1993, 2000) conception of abstract objects as mentally constructed entities. According to 
Asher, abstract objects are introduced for efficient natural language processing and other 
cognitive operations but do not exist independently of them. Roughly speaking, abstract 
objects only exist because we talk and think about them. Asher (1993:57f) assumes 
furthermore that there is a spectrum of world immanence that spans real and abstract 
objects. At one pole we find eventualities, which are real things in the world. At the other 
pole we have propositions, which are entirely abstract objects. Facts have a position 
somewhere in between, as shown in (30): they are abstract objects but they are bound to 
certain worlds. 
(30)  Asher’s spectrum of world immanence:
   eventualities  –  facts –  propositions 
   [spatiotemporal  entities]    [world  bound] 
         abstract  objects 
In view of our preliminary assumptions about the referents of copula expressions, let us 
augment this spectrum by introducing K-states as a further type of abstract object 
between eventualities and facts. K-states are bound to worlds and times, as indicated in 
(31).Claudia Maienborn 
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(31)  Locating K-states:
    eventualities  –  K-states  – facts –  propositions 
       [world and time bound]   [world bound] 
events  processes  D-states
  [spatiotemporal entities]               abstract objects 
Against this background, K-states can be characterized as follows: 
(32)  Working definition of K-states:
  K-states are abstract objects for the exemplification of a property P at a holder x 
and a time t. 
The tentative definition given in (32) is just a first step towards clarifying the nature of 
the entity referred to by copula constructions and statives. Even so, several properties of 
K-states may be derived from it, as shown in (33): 
(33)  Ontological properties of K-states: 
  a.   K-states, being abstract objects, are not accessible to direct perception. 
  b.   K-states, being abstract objects, are accessible to (higher) cognitive opera-
tions. 
  c.   K-states can be located in time. 
(34) gives the corresponding linguistic diagnostics. 
(34)  Linguistic diagnostics for K-states: 
  a.    K-state expressions cannot serve as infinitival complements of perception 
verbs. 
  b.   K-state expressions are accessible for anaphoric reference. 
  c.   K-state expressions combine with temporal modifiers. 
The outline of K-states given in (32)-(34) parallels the characterization of eventualities in 
(4)-(6). Taken together, they account for the ways in which the behavior of copula con-
structions (and statives) deviates from that of eventive expressions. 
4.3.  A K-state-based account of copula sentences in DRT 
In this section, I will sketch a K-state-based account of copula sentences within the 
framework of DRT (Kamp 1981, Kamp and Reyle 1993).9 The lexical entry for English 
be, German sein etc. is given in (35): 
(35)  be/sein/…: λP λx λz [z ≈ [P(x)]]  (z ranges over K-states) 
9 Cf. Asher (1993) for the compositional DRT variant with λ-abstraction employed here. I use a 
flat notation for DRSs: discourse referents are separated from DRS conditions by “ | ”. Against a Davidsonian Analysis of Copula Sentences 
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The copula introduces a referential argument z of type K-state which is characterized by 
the predicate P applying to the individual x.10 The compositional derivation of a copula 
construction is illustrated in (36). In (37) the corresponding composition of a D-state verb 
is given for comparison. 
(36)  a.   Carol ist müde.    (‘Carol is tired’) 
  b.   Carol:  [v | carol (v)] 
 c.    müde:  λy [tired (y)] 
 d.    [müde  sei-]:  λx λz [z ≈ [tired (x)]] 
 e.    [VP Carol müde sei-]:  λz [v | z ≈ [tired (v)], carol (v)] 
  f.   Infl:    λP [s | P(s)]  (s ranges over eventualities and K-states) 
 g.    [IP Carol ist müde]:  [z, v | z ≈ [tired (v)], carol (v)] 
(37)  a.   Carol schläft.    (‘Carol is sleeping’) 
 b.    schlafen:  λx λe [ sleep (e), theme (e, x)] (e ranges over eventualities)
 c.    [VP Carol schlaf-]: λe [v | sleep (e), theme (e, v), carol (v)] 
 d.    [IP Carol schläft]:  [e, v | sleep (e), theme (e, v), carol (v)] 
The difference between K-state and D-state expressions reduces to a sortal contrast. No 
further argument-structural or syntactic differences are required (or expected). The sortal 
difference can be exploited in the course of building up the compositional meaning. That 
is, while an eventuality argument is a suitable target for locative modifiers etc., K-state 
arguments won’t tolerate them. The difference disappears as soon as the referential argu-
ment is existentially bound by Infl. Thus, the analysis predicts that the difference between 
stative and eventive expressions is basically confined to the VP. No further contrasts are 
expected at higher functional levels. 
5.  Some implications for Davidsonian eventualities 
By way of conclusion I want to make two additional remarks, which suggest that K-states 
not only fare better for an analysis of copula sentences but may also simplify our assump-
10 Asher (1993:145f) defines “≈” as relating a discourse referent for an abstract object (i.e. facts, 
propositions etc.) to a DRS that characterizes this discourse referent. In order to add K-states, the syntactic 
well-formedness conditions for DRSs (Asher 1993:95f) must be augmented by the condition in (i); and the 
conditions on DRS embedding (Asher 1993:97) could be augmented by (ii). There might be alternative 
solutions but I do not want to discuss these issues here. 
(i)  Syntactic well-formedness condition for DRSs:
If z is a discourse referent of type K-state and X is a DRS, then z ≈ X is a DRS condition. 
(ii)  DRS embedding:
If ψ is a DRS condition of the form z ≈ X, then ψ is satisfied in a model M wrt w, t and an embed-
ding function f, iff f embeds X in M relative to w, t with t = τ(z). Claudia Maienborn 
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tions about Davidsonian eventualities. These remarks concern closure conditions and the 
latent infinite regress of eventualities. 
5.1. Closure  conditions 
On the received view, there is a split within the category of eventualities with respect to 
closure conditions: states but not events are closed under complementation (e.g. Herweg 
1991, Asher (1993, 2000). Our distinction between K-states and D-states calls for a more 
careful inspection of the relevant data. In fact, it turns out that only K-states are closed 
under negation, as (38) indicates. The denotatum of Carol was in the Studio and its nega-
tion are both K-states. As such they can be combined, for example, with temporal modi-
fiers.11
(38)  Carol war (nicht) im      Studio, und zwar eine Stunde lang.  K-states
  Carol was (not)    in.the studio, “in fact” for one hour. 
D-states, on the other hand, pattern with events and processes. (39) illustrates the 
behavior of events. The result of negating The train arrived does not express an event 
anymore. Thus, the addition of, for example, a locative modifier or a manner adverbial is 
excluded. Our category of D-states shows exactly the same behavior. Once we negate a 
D-state expression, locative modifiers or manner adverbials aren’t acceptable anymore, as 
(41) shows. (Ability to occur with temporal modifiers does not discriminate between K-
states and D-states and therefore is not a reliable diagnostic for D-states.) 
(39)  Der Zug ist (*nicht) angekommen, und zwar auf Gleis    drei  /pünktlich.  events
  The train did (*not) arrive,            “in fact”  on platform three/on time. 
(40)  Eva aß (*nicht) Pizza, und zwar gierig    /im Garten      /mit Renate.  processes
  Eva ate (*not)   pizza, “in fact”  greedily /in.the garden /with Renate. 
(41)  Paul wartete (*nicht) auf den Bus, und zwar dort   /lässig  /mit Carol.  D-states
  Paul waited  (*not)    for  the bus, “in fact”   there /coolly  /with Carol. 
The discussion of (38)-(41) shows that once we disentangle D-states as a subtype of 
eventualities from K-states, the category of eventualities turns out to behave more uni-
formly than generally assumed. There is no split within the category of eventualities with 
respect to closure under complementation.  
5.2.  Latent infinite regress of eventualities 
The second remark is related to a latent problem with the Davidsonian paradigm, which 
has so far received little attention. This concerns sentences like (42) and event-based 
semantic representations for them like (43); see section 2 above. 
11 German und zwar ‘in fact’ is a means of attaching VP-modifiers sentence-finally. This reduces 
the risk of confusing sentence negation with constituent negation. Against a Davidsonian Analysis of Copula Sentences 
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(42) Carol  is  tired. 
(43)  ∃e [tired (e) & theme (e, carol)]  
(43) indicates that there is an eventuality of tiredness and Carol is its theme. That is, the 
fact that Carol has a certain property apparently suffices to introduce an eventuality e. But 
what prevents us from taking the fact that e has a certain property to introduce another 
eventuality? That is, why can’t we replace (43) by (44) – or then go on even further, 
creating an infinite regress of eventualities?12
(44)  ∃ee’ [be-tired (e’) & theme (e’, e) & theme (e, carol)]  
A similar problem arises in the case of adverbial modification. It is not clear why a sen-
tence like (45) should be given an analysis like (45a) instead of (45b). 
(45)  Carol was driving quickly. 
 a.    ∃e [drive (e) & agent (e, carol) & quick (e)]  
 b.    ∃ee’ [drive (e) & agent (e, carol) & quick (e’) & theme (e’, e)] 
This dilemma is acknowledged by Geuder (2000): 
It is a puzzle of neo-Davidsonian semantics that predication of an individ-
ual can define a state, but the otherwise similar predication of an eventual-
ity never does; still we have to accept it as a matter of fact. 
(Geuder 2000:104) 
In my view, this is not a matter of fact – an empirical issue – but a weakness of the theory 
caused by stretching the notion of events too far. What we are confronted with here is the 
price of assuming that predication is inherently event-related. Under the account devel-
oped here, simple predication does not suffice to define a D-state. So, there is no risk of 
running into an infinite regress of eventualities.13
  To conclude, I hope to have shown that it is not only very useful to introduce 
events but – changing Davidson’s slogan somewhat – there is also a lot of language we 
can make systematic sense of if we stop misusing events.  
12 To my knowledge, Bennett (1988:177) was the first to raise this criticism. 
13 What about K-states? Could they become subject to infinite regress? That is, how do we 
exclude (i) as a semantic representation for (42)? 
(i)  [z, z’, v | z’ ≈ [z ≈ [tired (v)]], carol (v)] 
First, within the analysis proposed here there is no way to derive structures like (i) compositionally. K-
states are not introduced by arbitrary predicates but originate as referential arguments of the copula. Given 
this, it would be attractive to have a more restrictive formal system that excludes representations like (i) as 
syntactically ill-formed right from the start. The DRS well-formedness condition given in fn. 10 allows K-
states to be characterized by any DRS. But it would be simple (and legitimate) to impose further structural 
restrictions on admissible DRSs. Claudia Maienborn 
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  On the one hand, introducing K-states as a supplement to (rather than a substitute 
for) Davidsonian eventualities enables us to account for the linguistic behavior of copula 
constructions (in terms of anaphoric reference and occurrence with temporal modifiers) as 
well as for the differences between copula constructions and eventuality expressions 
(with respect to infinitival complements of perception verbs, occurrence with locative 
modifiers, manner adverbials, etc.).  
  On the other hand, taking some load off of eventualities allows us to stick to a 
well-motivated understanding of them as spatiotemporal entities and to simplify some of 
our assumptions about their logical properties. 
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